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The 2003 California recall election presented voters with a pair of choices. The
first was whether or not to recall Gray Davis as Governor of the state. They were then
faced with a list of 135 potential replacement candidates, one of whom would be chosen
in the event Davis lost on the initial recall question. The two ballot questions were
formally separate questions, but they were interrelated and conditional in nature. If I vote
in favor of recalling Davis as Governor, whom should I support to replace him?
Alternatively, voters who opposed recalling Davis as Governor had to decide who to vote
for as replacement candidate to try to insure that, if Davis were recalled, an acceptable
replacement candidate would be elected.
The task of choosing among 135 potential replacements for Davis posed some
unique challenges of its own. As the campaign progressed, many of the once-prominent
candidates, such as Bill Simon, Peter Ueberroth, and Arianna Huffington, dropped out of
the race.  Despite these departures, there remained a number of serious, well-known
candidates—Arnold Schwarzenegger, Tom McClintock, and Cruz Bustamante—as well
as some lesser-known political figures and celebrities, e.g. Larry Flynt, Gary Coleman
and Peter Camejo, as well as hundreds of unknowns.
While the interaction of the two recall election decisions raises several potentially
interesting research questions, in this chapter we concentrate on some basic tenets of
rational choice theory.  Are voters able to order candidates in a rational way?  If so, do
voters then cast ballots consistent with their ordering?  In seeking to answer these
questions, we analyze data from a telephone survey conducted by the Los Angeles Times
in the weeks before the October 7, 2003 election.  We find, subject to the limitations of
the data we utilize, that all but a small number of voters appear able to order their
candidates rationally, and that they appear to have cast their ballots in a manner that was
consistent with their preferences.
We view this as an important research question for reasons beyond the proximate
question of the administration of the gubernatorial recall election.  In recent years there
has been considerable controversy in the political science research community over the
role of rational choice theory generally (e.g. Green and Shapiro 1994; Friedman 1996), or
over its application to specific domains of political behavior, such as voter turnout
(Aldrich 1993; Jackman 1993). This controversy echoes earlier debates concerning the
behavioral assumptions of economic approaches to the study of individual behavior (e.g.
Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
1
  Much of this debate has focused on whether or not
individual decision makers make decisions in line with the basic assumptions of rational
choice theory.
In elementary form, rational choice theory posits that individuals take actions in
order to achieve a purpose, such as getting their most-preferred candidate elected to
office. This means that we must define a preference relation for voters, which typically
requires assuming that a voter’s preferences over outcomes is transitive (Ordeshook
1986).  If we consider three outcomes, then transitivity exists “if the first outcome is no
worse than the second and the second is no worse than the third, then the first is no worse
than the third” (Ordeshook 1986, page 12).
As applied to the context of voter choice in the gubernatorial recall election, this
implies that voters should be able to determine whether they strictly prefer one candidate
to another or are indifferent between the two candidates.  Behaviorally, rational choice
theory then posits that if a voter prefers one candidate in a set of transitively ordered
candidates, that, barring additional strategic considerations, she is expected to cast a vote
for that preferred candidate.
2
We are not the first to try to study the extent to which individual voters act
consistently with rational choice assumptions. Brady and Ansolabehere (1989), using
pair-wise comparison data over large numbers of candidates, find that “people’s
preferences satisfy the requirements of rational choice and that their preference can be
represented in a convenient form” (page 148).  Radcliff (1993) uses different data and a
different methodology, but reaches largely the same conclusion:  “the evidence presented
here suggests that despite some slippage the bulk of the sample is quite capable of
maintaining well-ordered preferences with as many as five alternatives” (page 716).
                                                 
1 An excellent summary of the early debates over rational choice theory is found in
Ordeshook (1986, pages 485-486).
2 Strategic voting occurs when a voter, believing that their most preferred candidate has
no chance of winning, opts for a lesser preferred candidate.  For an analysis of strategic
voting in the 2003 California recall see Alvarez and Kiewiet (2005).
We seek to determine how California voters, when faced with the two-question
recall and candidate replacement ballot with a list of 135 candidates—ordered the top
candidates, and how their preference orderings were associated with the choices they
made on the recall election ballot. In the next section of this paper we discuss our
methodology, and we follow that with a presentation of our results.  The final section of
this paper provides our concluding remarks.
Methodology
The telephone survey data we analyze is taken from the Los Angeles Times Poll,
distributed by The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.
3
  The survey was
conducted September 25-29, 2003, and was based upon a sample of adult California
residents; 1,982 respondents were interviewed.  Filter questions on citizenship and
registration reduced the sample to 1,496 registered voters.
In order to develop an understanding of voter preference orderings across the
primary candidates in the recall election we require questions that ask respondents to
evaluate the candidates. In an ideal world, we would adopt Brady and Ansolabahere’s
(1989) method of paired comparison questions, but unfortunately, the Los Angeles Times
Poll did not ask this type of question. This survey instead employed a battery that, for
Davis, Bustamante, McClintock and Schwarzenegger, asked voters, “What is your
impression of [each candidate]?  As of today, is it very favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable, very unfavorable—or haven’t you heard enough about him to
say?”  The responses of those who hadn’t heard of the candidate, who said they were
unsure about their impression, or otherwise did not answer the question, are treated as
missing data.
Previous studies in the area (Radcliff 1993; Feld and Grofman 1988; Niemi and
Wright 1987) have generally employed the standard “feeling thermometer” measures of
candidate evaluations. Such measures ask respondents to rate how favorably they feel
                                                 
3 We thank Susan Pinkus of the Los Angeles Times Poll for her assistance in providing us
with these data.
about particular candidates on a 0 to 100 scale. Responses to the questions we are using
here would thus appear to be equivalent to a very coarse feeling thermometer. It turns
out, however, that feeling thermometer ratings tend to cluster at a small number of points,
especially 50, 60, 70, and 85 (Weisberg and Miller 1979). Using a method which allows
respondents to assign candidates to only four categories of evaluation may therefore
result in little loss of information concerning candidate evaluations. Not surprisingly, the
measures we employ here do result in a large number of ties, e.g., rating two or more
candidates somewhat favorably, but so too do feeling thermometers. With these caveats
in mind, we are hopeful that these measures will provide some us with some ability to
assess the extent to which voters are able to order the candidates and then vote
consistently with these preference orderings.
We used these evaluations of each of the four major candidates—Davis,
Bustamante, McClintock, and Schwarzenegger—to produce each voter’s preference
ranking of the four candidates. To give some sense for the preference rankings held by
voters at the end of September (a week before the recall election) we list the top fifteen
preference orderings in the registered voter sample in Table 1.
4
  This table lists each
preference order, and the relative frequency in the sample.  When registered voters had a
clear preference between a pair of candidates, we use the notation (for example, the voter
prefers Davis to Bustamante) “D p B.”  In situations where the data do not allow for clear
ordering, where in other words the evaluations provided by the voters lead to ties
between pairs of candidates, we use the notation (for example, where the voter was
indifferent between Davis and Bustamante)“DB”.
What we see in Table 1 is a predominance of preference orderings in which
McClintock or Schwarzenegger were preferred to Bustamante or Davis. The top five
preference orderings in our dataset, held by 333 of the 1483 registered voters who
provided an evaluation of at least one of the four candidates, were of this nature. The rest
of the respondents reported dozens of different preference orderings, and in these Davis
and Bustamante tended to fare better. Still, that Davis lost the recall and Bustamante lost
the replacement election are not surprising outcomes in light of these data. It should be
                                                 
4 In the tables that follow, the data reported are weighted by the weight variable provided
in the Los Angeles Times Poll.
noted that, as expected, the coarseness of the evaluation measure we used, resulted in a
very large number of ties involving two or more candidates.
Table 1 about here
Were Vote Choices Consistent with Evaluations?
The next task we undertook was to examine what is probably the most modest
expectation that one might derive from rational choice theory, and that is to determine
whether voters’ choices were consistent with their evaluations. This may seem like a very
low bar, but previous studies have found that candidate evaluations, as registered by
ratings on feeling thermometer measures, do not always line up that well with vote
choice. Respondents often do not vote for the candidate they have assigned the highest
thermometer score. Others vote for the candidate they have assigned the lowest score,
and some vote for candidates that they did not even rate on the feeling thermometer. All
told, in many cases the mismatch between candidate evaluations measured by feeling
thermometers and reported vote choice exceeds 20% (Alvarez and Kiewiet 2005).  This
slippage may arise, of course, because the feeling thermometer methodology is flawed,
and not because respondents are inconsistent. This also means that our tests of the
consistency between evaluations and vote choice are as much a test of the evaluation
questions used as they are of respondent consistency.
We begin by comparing evaluations of Davis to vote choice on the recall
question. In these and in the analysis of other candidates’ supporters, we confine our
analysis initially to those voters who could evaluate all four major candidates. We
consider Davis to be the top-ranked candidate in a voter’s preference ordering if they
gave an evaluation of Davis that was at least as good as all of the other candidates, or in
which Davis was evaluated as better than all of the other candidates.  Such voters should
have voted against the recall. Every voter who evaluated Davis last, of course, should
have voted for the recall.
The figures in Table 2 show that of the 280 registered voters who our approach
estimated as having Davis as a top-ranked candidate, almost 95% voted against recalling
him. On the other hand, 85% of those who did not put Davis at the top of their preference
ordering voted for the recall of Davis as governor. This degree of correspondence is
remarkably high, and in fact is a good deal higher than the typical level of
correspondence that is found between vote choice and feeling thermometer ratings. As
indicated earlier, Alvarez and Kiewiet (2005) argue that a number of features of the
feeling thermometer measures make them suspect as a source of data from which to infer
preference orderings. The findings here thus lend addition support to their critique of
these commonly used measures.
Table 2 about here
But why would any Davis supporter favor the recall?  We also found, conversely, that a
similar number of voters who ranked Davis at the bottom of their preference ordering
voted against the recall. Some amount of error in survey data is inevitable, but we suspect
that some voters were confused as to whether “recalling” Davis meant that he would lose
office or retain it. It is sometimes good to be recalled, after an audition, for example,
because it means that you have survived a cut. Some voters might have believed that
recalling Davis would keep him in office.
The recall question on the actual ballot was most likely more helpful in this regard
than the poll question. The Los Angeles Times Poll asked, “…would you vote YES to
recall Governor Davis or would you vote NO, not to recall Governor Davis? The question
that appeared on the California ballot was, “Should Gray Davis be recalled (removed)
from the Office of Governor?” Including the word “removed” should have helped reduce
confusion as to what it meant to recall Davis.
For supporters of the other three candidates, we assessed the level of agreement
between candidate evaluations and vote choice in the replacement election. As before, a
voter who evaluated a candidate higher or at least as high as any other candidate was
deemed to make that candidate a top choice.  Table 3, which reports results for
Bustamante supporters, shows that about 68% of the registered voters who evaluated
Bustamante highest or at least as high as other candidates stated that they would vote for
Bustamante in the replacement election. 11% said they would cast a vote for some
candidate other than Bustamante.  This could include any one of several minor
candidates, but Peter Camejo, candidate of the Green Party, and liberal commentator
Arianna Huffington were the most common such alternatives chosen. Only 2.4% of the
voters who did not rank Bustamante at the top indicated an intention to vote for him,
compared to 88% who said they would vote for someone else.
Table 3 about here
Table 4 repeats the analysis for Schwarzenegger’s supporters.  In this case, 76%
of registered voters who rated Schwarzenegger higher or at a least as high as any other
candidate said they were voting for him to replace Davis as governor, while 13% said
they were voting for some other candidate—again, usually one of the many minor
candidates on the replacement ballot.  Of the registered voters who did not evaluate
Schwarzenegger the highest, 78% said they would support another candidate, 20% had no
opinion, and fewer than 2% indicated an intention to vote for Schwarzenegger.
Table 4 about here
In Table 5 we examine McClintock’s evaluations and voter support.  Here we find
a much larger gap than previously between evaluations and vote intentions. Less than half
(39%) of the registered voters who rated McClintock the top candidate (or tied for top
candidate) stated that they would cast a ballot for him to replace Davis as governor, while
almost 50% said they were voting for another candidate—in almost all cases fellow
Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger.  Of those who did not rate McClintock at the top of
their preference ordering, 70% said they were voting for other candidates, and a scant
0.5% said they were supporting McClintock. What we have here, then, is a large amount
of strategic voting.  Believing that McClintock had little or no chance of winning the
election, many of his supporters had decided to support an acceptable alternative,
Schwarzenegger, who had a far better chance of winning. Breaking down the vote of
respondents who stated that their first preference was McClintock (575 respondents), of
those who indicated a vote choice, 230 opted for Schwarzenegger while 222 stayed loyal
to McClintock.
We next repeated the cross-tabulations reported in Tables 2 through 5 after
including respondents who were only capable of ordering their preferences over three
candidates. We find an almost identical pattern of results, even though this added 257
voters to the analysis.
Consistency in Choice across the Recall Question and Replacement Election
In the previous section we found that most voters in the 2003 California recall
satisfied what is admittedly a very modest criterion of rationality, that of voting in a
manner consistent with their preference orderings on both the recall question and the
replacement election. It was common for voters who ranked one of the major candidates
highest in the replacement election to announce a vote intention for one of the many
minor candidates, and a large share of McClintock voters reported an intention to vote
strategically for Schwarzenegger. Those who did not give a candidate the most favorable
evaluation, however, rarely indicated that they would vote for that candidate.
The next question we investigate is the relationship between voters’ choices on
the recall question and in the replacement election.  Those who preferred one of the three
other major candidates to Davis presumably wanted that candidate to be governor. What
we are primarily interested in here, though, is whether such voters nonetheless voted
against the recall of Davis because they feared someone they liked even less than Davis
might be elected.
Although such voters might be called strategic voters, we will instead call them
“hedge” voters to highlight a difference between what they are doing and conventional
strategic voting.  Strategic voting, as it is commonly understood, occurs when voters
believe the candidate they most prefer has no chance of winning and so they opt instead
for a less preferred candidate who does have a realistic chance of winning. In so doing
they are still choosing to vote for the candidate they want to win the election.  In this
case, voters are hedging their bets, supporting Davis by voting against the recall so as to
prevent an even worse candidate from winning. The candidate they are voting for in the
replacement election can thus win only if the outcome of the recall (Davis is recalled)
runs counter to how they voted (against the recall).  Those who are not hedge voters, i.e.
who vote for their most preferred candidate but for the recall, we will call consistent
voters.
Table 6 reports the frequency of hedge voters among the supporters of each of the
major candidates.  Those whose most preferred candidate was Davis, of course, could not
be hedge voters.  Not surprisingly, Bustamante supporters were much more likely than
Schwarzenegger and McClintock supporters to hedge their bets and vote against the
recall of Davis. For one thing, they were much more sanguine about the prospect of
fellow Democrat Davis remaining in office, and considerably more negative in their
perceptions` of Schwarzenegger, the likely and eventual Republican winner.
This hedging strategy was, in fact, exactly what Democratic leaders during the
recall campaign urged voters to do. Many worried, though, that Bustamante supporters
would balk at voting against the recall, as the only way Bustamante could win was for
Davis to lose. Davis supporters also perceived that Bustamante was soft-pedaling the “no
on the recall” message.  In any case, these data indicate that the vast majority of
Bustamante backers followed the cues of party leaders and hedged on the recall.
Table 6 about here
In order to more comprehensively check for the incidence of hedge voting versus
consistent voting we conducted a logit analysis. Consistent voters, as indicated earlier,
are those voters who voted for their most preferred candidate in the replacement election
and for Davis’s recall.  Because so many of McClintock backers voted strategically for
Schwarzenegger, we consider such voters to also be consistent. Those who are not
consistent in this way are considered hedge voters, and are coded as 1, consistent voters
as 0. Only a limited set of independent variables could be derived from the survey, but we
were able to specify the respondent’s education level, income, gender, the reported level
of interest the respondent has in the election, their party registration (Republican or
Democrat), and their ethnicity.  The ethnicity variable was converted into a dummy
variable which takes on the value of 1 for Latinos, 0 otherwise. Our expectations were
that Democrats were far more likely to be hedge voters than Republicans, but that
Latinos, controlling for party registration, would be less likely to hedge due to greater
support for Latino candidate Bustamante. We also expected that better educated voters,
higher income voters, and those with a high degree of interest in the campaign might be
politically more sophisticated and thus more likely to be hedge voters. The reverse
expectation holds for first-time voters, who might be suspected of being less likely to
adopt a hedging strategy because of political inexperience.
As the results reported in Table 7 indicate, registered Republicans were, as
expected, far less likely than Democratic registrants to hedge their bets and vote against
the recall. Latino voters, contrary to expectations, were more likely to hedge, giving
greater support to Davis in his fight against the recall rather than less.  Respondents’
income, education, gender was not predictive of what type of voter they were, and
whether or not they were a first time voter was also of no consequence. ,
The other significant effect evident from the results in Table 7 is the propensity of
voters with a high interest in the campaign to vote consistently, which is also the opposite
of what we had hypothesized. A further check of the data reveals that Republican voters
in general and Schwarzenegger supporters in particular indicated having a particularly
high level of interest in the campaign. Those whose highest ranked candidate was Davis,
in contrast, claimed to have considerably less interest in the campaign on average. To
many of them, the recall might have seemed like a bad dream that they wished would just
go away.  As a consequence of these associations, higher interest in the campaign was
linked to less, not more, hedge voting.
Table 7 about here
Discussion
Our analysis of voting behavior in the recall election provides support for a
number of arguments. First, despite the fact that the recall election was held on short
notice, involved a long ballot with an unusual structure, and was subjected to a
substantial amount of confusing pre-election litigation, it appears that voters were able to
rationally order the candidates and to state voting intentions consistent with those
orderings.  Despite the problems associated with the recall election, administrative or
otherwise, it appears that that voters by and large got it right. While our data was limited
to an analysis of only the top four candidates, and was also limited to what other
measures were present on the Los Angeles Times survey, we did find that voters rarely
stated vote intentions that were not consistent with the way in which they evaluated the
candidates.
This result simultaneously serves to bolster the validity of the candidate
evaluation questions that were employed, which simply asked respondents to rate their
impression of the major candidates as very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat
unfavorable, or very unfavorable. Despite the coarseness of a measure that allowed for
only four response categories, the agreement between candidate evaluations and vote
choice. We conclude from this that it is preferable to pose evaluative questions that
repeatedly offer the same small number of response categories, rather than to ask for a 0
to 100 rating.  It appears that when specific response categories are not offered,
respondents have difficulty keeping a consistent calibration in their ratings, and are more
prone to make mistakes.
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Table 1:  Most Frequent Preference Orderings
Order Frequency Percentage
MS p BD 98 6.6%
S p M p BD 87 5.9%
M p S p BD 70 4.7%
MS p BD 46 3.1%
S p M p B p D 32 2.2%
BD p MS 30 2.0%
MS p B p D 25 1.7%
MBD p S 24 1.6%
M p S p B p D 23 1.6%
BD p M p S 22 1.5%
MS p B p D 19 1.3%
BD p S 16 1.1%
BD p MS 16 1.1%
BD p S 15 1.0%
MB p SD 15 1.0%
Table 2:  Preference Orderings and Recall Vote Preference
Recall Vote
Davis Top-Ranked Davis Not Top-
Ranked
Against 94.5 13.9
For 5.2 85.2
No Opinion 0.3 0.9
N 280 704
Table 3:  Preference Orderings and Replacement Vote: Bustamante
Replacement
Vote
Bustamante Top-
Ranked
Bustamante Not
Top-Ranked
Bustamante 67.9 2.4
Others 10.5 87.8
No Opinion 21.6 9.7
N 316 523
Table 4:  Preference Orderings and Replacement Vote: Schwarzenegger
Replacement
Vote
Schwarzenegger
Top-Ranked
Schwarzenegger
Not Top-Ranked
Schwarzenegger 76.0 1.8
Others 12.4 78.2
No Opinion 11.5 20.0
N 515 393
Table 5:  Preference Orderings and Replacement Vote: McClintock
Replacement
Preference
McClintock Top-
Ranked
McClintock Not
Top-Ranked
McClintock 38.5 0.5
Others 49.7 70.0
No Opinion 11.7 29.5
Number of Cases 575 247
                                    Table 6: Frequency of Hedge Voters
Most Preferred
Candidate
Hedge Voters
(in percent)
n
Schwarzenegger 9.0 524
Bustamante 84.2 260
McClintock 30.8 439
Table 7: Logit Analysis of Hedge Voting
Variable Coefficient
(error)
Constant .36
(.39)
Education .06
(.04)
Income -.02
(.02)
First-time
voter
.03
(.26)
Interest in
election
-.39*
(.07)
Female -.03
(.12)
Democrat .11
(.15)
Republican -.75*
(.17)
Latino .34*
(.14)
*   = p < .05
n = 1496

